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COMMUNITY REIMBURSEMENT FOR A
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE UPON DISSOLUTION
In 1985, the California Civil Code was amended to require, at di-
vorce, that the community be reimbursed for the costs of an edu-
cation of training acquired during marriage. The new code provi-
sions represent a unique response to what many have described as
a basic unfairness inherent in the California community property
system. This Comment will examine the new code provisions in
relation to prior California case law, and the response to the issue
in other states; examine the forces which provided the impetus for
the passage of the provisions; discuss the practical implications of
the amendments; and finally, examine the interrelationship of the
reimbursement remedy with the remainder of the California com-
munity property system.
INTRODUCTION
According to California law prior to January 1, 1985, a spouse,
prior to or at dissolution, had no right or interest in the professional
degree of his or her marital partner, although the degree was ob-
tained by virtue of an education or training acquired entirely during
the marriage.' This judicially formulated doctrine stood in bleak
contrast to the fundamental principle of the California community
property system, which provides, with a few limited exceptions,2 that
each spouse has an equal interest in all property acquired during the
course of the marriage.3
1. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1984),
rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1984). See also In re Marriage of
Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), disapproved on other
grounds in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); Todd v.
Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1983). These sections define as separate
property any property acquired after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. There
is, however, a presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse's
work or effort is community property. See See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 783, 51 Cal. Rptr.
888, 891 (1966).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983). Upon divorce, the court must divide all
community property equally between the spouses. Id. at § 4800(a) (West 1983).
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Beginning in 1985, amendments to the California Civil Code,
designed to ameliorate the harshness of prior law regarding the dis-
position of a professional education, became effective.4 The new pro-
visions 5 delineate a two pronged approach to the resolution of the
rights of a husband or wife in the degree or license of his or her
spouse. 6 First, section 4800.3 provides that at dissolution the court
must order reimbursement to the community for contributions to the
education or training of a spouse which has substantially enhanced
his or her earning capacity.7 Reimbursement may be reduced, modi-
fied, or eliminated by either an express written agreement of the par-
ties to the contrary, or to the extent that circumstances render full
reimbursement unjust. 8 Loans incurred during the marriage for an
education are not treated as a community liability, but rather are
assigned to the party who received the professional degree.9 Second,
an amendment to section 4801 requires the court to consider, in de-
termining the amount of spousal support to be awarded, the extent
to which the nonprofessional spouse contributed to the achievement
of an education, license, or training of the other spouse.10
In effect, the new provisions of the Civil Code represent a com-
plete revision of preexisting legal principles governing the treatment
4. Id. at §§ 4800.3, and 4801 (West Supp. 1985).
5. The changes comprise the addition of section 4800.3, the deletion of section
4800(b)(4), and the amendment of section 4801. Id. at §§ 4800.3, 4800, and 4801 (West
Supp. 1985).
6. Id. at § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
7. Reimbursement includes interest at the legal rate, which is calculated from
the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were made. Id. at § 4800.3(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1985).
8. Id. at § 4800.3(c) (West Supp. 1985). The code itself provides several exam-
ples of situations where reimbursement might be deemed unjust. First, reimbursement
will not be ordered if the community has substantially benefited from the education. If
the marriage ends less than ten years after the educational process, the presumption is
that the community has not substantially benefited from the education; if the community
contributions were made more than ten years before divorce, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the community has substantially benefited from the education. Second,
reimbursement will be denied if the education is offset by education or training received
by the supporting spouse which is paid for with community contributions. Third, where
the training enables the recipient to engage in gainful employment and substantially
reduces his or her need for spousal support, reimbursement is unavailable. Id.
9. Id. at §§ 4800, 4800.3(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). Prior to the 1984 amend-
ments, section 4800(b)(4), relating to educational loans, read as follows: "Educational
loans shall be assigned to the spouse receiving the education in the absence of extraordi-
nary circumstances rendering such an assignment unjust." This section was deleted and
replaced with section 4800 which provides that educational loans "shall not be included
among the liabilities of the community . . . but shall be assigned for payment to the
party [receiving the education]." Id. at § 4800.3(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
10. Id. at § 4801(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). A reciprocal provision of section
4800.3 provides that nothing in the section shall limit the effect of spousal contributions
or reimbursement in considering the parties' circumstances, for the purposes of determin-
ing section 4801 support payments. Id. at § 4800.3(d) (West Supp. 1985).
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of professional degrees and licenses upon divorce." This "revolution"
in family law is the focus of this Comment, which will examine the
evolution of California case law in this area prior to the enactment
of the new Civil Code sections; the varied responses in other jurisdic-
tions to the same issue; the forces which prompted and motivated the
revitalization of California law in this area; the practical applications
of the new law; and, finally, whether the revisions are an adequate
response, in a community property system, to the issue of compensa-
tion for contributions to the education of a spouse.
PRIOR CALIFORNIA CASE LAW
Prior to the enactment of section 4800.3 and amendment of sec-
tion 4801, a well established principle of California case law dictated
that an education or training, even if acquired exclusively during
marriage, was not a property right capable of division upon di-
vorce.' 2 In effect, an educated spouse was legally permitted to leave
a marriage without compensating the community for its contribu-
tions to his or her greatly enhanced earning capacity. The nonacquir-
ing spouse, who may have represented the primary or even exclusive
source of support, thereby facilitating the educational process, was
denied any interest whatsoever in the fruits of his or her sacrifices.
This strand of legal authority had its genesis in the 1945 Califor-
nia case of Franklin v. Franklin, which concerned the property sta-
tus of a cause of action for the personal injuries of one spouse upon
dissolution.13 In determining that, while money recovered during
marriage for personal injuries was community property, the right to
sue for such injuries was not, the court, in a single sentence of dic-
tum, stated: "[tihe right to practice medicine and similar profes-
sions, for instance, is a property right but it is not one which could
be classified as community property." 4
Twenty-four years later, in the first California case to specifically
address the issue of a potential spousal interest in the education or
training of a marital partner, that single sentence of dictum was
transformed into a majority opinion.' 5 In Todd v. Todd, the husband
11. Compare Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 37
Cal. 3d at 771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (community has no interest in professional degree),
with CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985) (community entitled to reimburse-
ment for its contribution to education).
12. See cases cited supra note 1.
13. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 636 (1945).
14. Id. at 725, 155 P.2d at 644.
15. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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had obtained a law degree during marriage while his wife worked;
by the time the divorce action began, however, he had been practic-
ing fourteen years and the assets of the community were substan-
tial."' In rejecting Mrs. Todd's claim that the education of her hus-
band was a community asset, the court, by reference to Franklin,
determined that his education was an intangible property right, and
was therefore incapable of having a divisible dollar value.1 7
A decade later, a second California appellate decision adhered to
the Todd decision in holding that a legal education could not be con-
sidered a community asset.18 The court reasoned that to allow the
community an interest in the husband's legal degree would, in effect,
require a division of assets acquired after the dissolution - assets
that clearly, under California law, were separate property.' 9 While
noting that a recent Iowa Supreme Court decision had found a
spousal interest in a professional degree, the court found that case
"unpersuasive," and refused to follow it.20
In the last case to address the issue before the California legisla-
ture became involved, an appellate court in In re Marriage of Sulli-
16. Id. at 789, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Mrs. Todd worked full-time while her hus-
band attended school, and for several years after his graduation. During the remainder of
the marriage, she continued to work on a part-time basis. As a result of their mutual
efforts, the community had net assets of over $200,000 at the time of their separation,
which were divided unequally between the spouses under then applicable California Civil
Code section 4800. Mrs. Todd received $111,500 in community assets; her husband
$89,100. Furthermore, Mrs. Todd was awarded $200 per month alimony. Thus, in this
instance, the supporting wife was awarded additional assets, arguably to offset her contri-
bution to her husband's education. Id. at 791, 795, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 143. Under the
revised code, however, an unequal division of community assets is impermissible. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 4800 (West 1983).
17. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
18. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 668, disapproved on
other grounds in Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 808, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 853. Mrs. Aufmuth sought,
on appeal, only to offset the obligation of the community for her husband's student loan
by the value of his legal education. Id. at 460, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
19. Id. at 462, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678. The court reasoned that if the community
was permitted to claim an interest in an education acquired during marriage it would in
effect have been awarded a portion of the professional spouse's future earnings, which
resulted from his or her enhanced earning capacity. Id. Property acquired after divorce
(such as post-divorce earnings) is separate and thus nondivisible. CAL. CIV. CODE §§
5107, 5108 (West 1983). The trial court awarded Mrs. Aufmuth a spousal support pay-
ment of $1,000 per month for an infinite duration, which the appellate decision explicity
upheld. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673. Such an unusually high
support award may have been partially motivated by recognition of Mrs. Aufmuth's sub-
stantial contribution to her husband's educational costs.
20. Atifmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 461-62 n.5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678 n.5. In the
Iowa case referred to by the Aufmuth court, In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885 (Iowa 1978), the majority opinion held that the potential for increase in future earn-
ings made possible by a law degree was an asset which could be considered in determin-
ing an equitable distribution of property and assets. That court also held, however, that
the legal education and license themselves could not be considered assets capable of equi-
table distribution. Id. at 891.
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van, upon rehearing,21 reversed itself in refusing to grant the com-
munity an interest in a degree. The court held, over a vigorous
partial dissent, that a professional education acquired during mar-
riage was neither community nor separate property.22 The majority
determined that Mrs. Sullivan was not entitled to either a cash set-
tlement or, as she had not demonstrated any need for financial sup-
port, any form of alimony. Hence, she received nothing to offset her
contribution to the medical degree of her husband.23 Shortly after
the new Civil Code provisions became effective, the California Su-
preme Court, which had refrained from issuing decision on Sullivan
for more than two years, reversed and remanded the case in light of
sections 4800.3 and 4801.24
California case law prior to the intervention of the California leg-
islature, while limited, clearly stood for the proposition that a spouse
could acquire no right or interest in the education of his or her part-
ner, although the education was acquired entirely during the mar-
25riage. Moreover, because California courts are required to divide
all community assets equally,26 an equitable solution giving the sup-
21. 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at 771, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 359. In its initial hearing, the Sullivan court determined, by a 3-0 decision,
that a professional education is the holder's separate property, but if the community had
contributed to its enhancement, it should share in its value. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 565,
modified, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at 771, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 359.
22. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 641-44, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 803-06, rev'd, 37
Cal. 3d at 771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359. Justice Ziebarth's dissent stressed that at least
where community assets are limited, and the educated spouse has had his or her earning
capacity enhanced by an education acquired during marriage, the community should be
permitted a financial interest in the increased earnings. Id. at 664, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
23. Id. at 642, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 804. At the time of trial, Mrs. Sullivan's earn-
ings were estimated at $26,400 a year. Id. This was the first California case to deny the
nonprofessional spouse offsetting property or support arguably representing partial com-
pensation for contributions to her marital partner's education.
24. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 768, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357. The court determined that
because the Sullivan's property settlement was not final as of January 1, 1985, Mrs.
Sullivan was entitled to the benefit of the new amendment. Id.
25. Sullivan, Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at
771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359. See also Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. at
131; Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 668, disapproved on other
grounds in In re Marriage of Lucas, 127 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 166 Cal. Rptr. 808, 860
(1980).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1983). In a majority of other jurisdictions,
divorce courts need not effect an equal division of marital property and assets. In thirty-
eight states, marital property is divided under an equitable distribution scheme. See
Note, Disposition of a Professional Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage: What Will
Oregon's Solution Be? 20 WILLAMETTE L.J. 141, 143 n.l 1 (1983). Under an earlier ver-
sion of section 4800, in force at the time of the Todd decision, community assets could be
divided unequally. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 795, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 143.
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porting spouse a greater share of the community property was im-
possible. Finally, the determination by the court of spousal support
payments could not be influenced by contributions to one spouse's
education made by the nonacquiring marital partner.17 Thus, at dis-
solution, there was no legal mechanism by which a supporting spouse
might receive compensation for contributions to his or her spouse's
degree .2
s
THE TREATMENT OF SPOUSAL CONTRIBUTIONS To PROFESSIONAL
DEGREES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In contrast to the position espoused by the California judiciary,
courts in many other jurisdictions have endorsed various types of
monetary awards to the nonacquiring spouse for support rendered
during the educational process.29 In the majority of cases, these
courts have either ordered some type of alimony payment,30 or ef-
fected an unequal property division.3 ' These methods of compensa-
tion reflect the tension between two prevalent legal doctrines: first,
the notion that a professional degree is not a property right capable
of valuation and division upon divorce; second, the realization that
fairness compels restitution for contributions to an education which
has bestowed upon the holder a greatly enhanced earning capacity.32
A small minority of courts have recently indicated their willingness
to go beyond traditional doctrine and find that the enhanced earning
capacity generated by an education is a property right susceptible of
division at divorce.3 3 At present, however, these decisions have not
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801 (West 1983).
28. Id. This section does allow a divorce court to consider, in determining spousal
support, any factors it deems just and equitable. Id. at § 4801(a)(9).
29. See generally Note, Til Degree Do Us Part: The Community Property Inter-
est in a Professional Degree, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 275 (1984); Note, supra note 26. In large
part, judicial willingness to afford some compensation to the supporting spouse is tracea-
ble to the latitude afforded the divorce courts of other states in granting equitable prop-
erty divisions and alimony awards. See supra note 26.
30. E.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527; Mori v. Mori, 124
Ariz. 193, 603 P.2d 85 (1979); Stansberry v. Stansberry, 580 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1978);
Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); McAllister v.
McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
31. E.g., Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977); In re
Marriage of Varnet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Mo. 1976); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d
744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975); Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 186, 510 P.2d 905 (1973);
Tremayner v. Tremayner, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949).
32. See generally Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce,
16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 227, 234-35 (1983). Under California law, in contrast, prior to the
enactment of section 4800.3 and amendment of section 4801, the courts could not, absent
holding that an education comprised a divisible community asset, compensate the nonac-
quiring spouse for contributions made to the professional partner's education. See CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4800, 4801 (West 1983).
33. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. In-
man, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App.
258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983).
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received widespread acceptance.3 4
Spousal Support Awards
As noted above, many courts have indicated a willingness to take
less sweeping steps in granting some relief to a nonprofessional
spouse. An enhanced alimony award has been a popular tool em-
ployed for this purpose. 35 Recently, the New Jersey Supreme
Court,36 while determining that a business degree was not an asset
capable of equitable distribution at dissolution, nonetheless approved
an award of $5,000 in "reimbursement alimony" to a wife who had
supported her husband throughout the educational process, as an off-
setting compensatory award.3 7 Similarly, an Oklahoma court of ap-
peals upheld an award of $39,600 in "permanent alimony" for a
wife's contribution to the increased earning capacity of a medical
degree and license.38 In the Michigan case of Moss v. Moss,39 the
court sustained a settlement of $15,000 "alimony in gross" to a wife
who put her husband through medical school.40
In general, alimony given to the nonprofessional spouse has not
been substantial.41 Such awards appear to be based primarily on a
crude calculation of what constitutes fair reimbursement to the sup-
porting spouse, rather than determined by reference to the actual
value (perhaps measured by the professional's future income stream)
of the education obtained.42
34. A majority of courts have refused to find that an educational degree is prop-
erty. Mullenix, supra note 32, at 253.
35. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500, 453 A.2d at 534. The court determined that reim-
bursement alimony "should cover all financial contributions toward the former spouse's
education, including household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and
any other contributions used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or
license." Id. (emphasis by the court).
38. Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
39. 264 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
40. Id. at 98.
41. Mullenix, supra note 32, at 234, 235.
42. Id. at 242, 248. Any attempt to place a monetary value on that part of a
spouse's enhanced earning capacity which is attributable to contributions made by the
supporting spouse would encounter substantial valuation problems. In part, these difficul-
ties are due to the subjective analysis involved; it is problematic at best to determine how
a professional spouse's intelligence, motivation, and the like contributed to his or her




In a similar vein, other courts, operating under the rubric of equi-
table principles, have given the nonacquiring spouse an offsetting
award of property or cash as compensation for support rendered dur-
ing the educational process. 3 In one extreme example, a court
awarded the supporting wife virtually all of the marital assets, in-
cluding the family residence.44 Other jurisdictions permit restitution
to the husband or wife who has expended personal earnings to fi-
nance the professional degree or license of the marital partner.45 In
one case, the restitutionary remedy was extended to encompass both
living and educational expenses incurred during the acquisition of a
medical degree.46
An Education as a Property Right
A handful of courts have transcended traditional doctrine in find-
ing that an education, or at least some of the attributes thereof,
should be considered, at least at dissolution, a property right capable
of valuation.47 These courts have focused upon the greatly enhanced
earning capacity that the educated spouse attained during marriage
as the primary indicator of the value of such an education.48 Upon
divorce in these jurisdictions the nonprofessional spouse is entitled to
an additional monetary award representing his or her interest in the
license or degree of the marital partner.4 9
In a 1978 case, the Iowa Supreme Court, by affirming an $18,000
property award to a supporting spouse, became the first court in the
nation to acknowledge that an increase in earning capacity could be
considered a marital asset.5° Here, the equities of the marital situa-
tion were strongly in favor of the supporting wife; during the mar-
riage, the couple had acquired no assets of any substantial value,
save the husband's medical degree.51 Thus, in this instance, finding
43. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 31. Some courts have awarded the supporting
spouse both property and spousal support. See, e.g., Bowen v. Bowen, 347 So. 2d 675,
676-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
44. Vanet, 544 S.W.2d at 241.
45. E.g., In re Marriage of De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757-59 (Minn. 1981);
Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
46. De La Rosa, 309 N.W. at 758. The court subtracted all educational costs and
half of the student spouse's living expenses from the supporting spouse's contributions to
the couple's living expenses, and awarded the nonprofessional spouse the subtracted
amount as "restitution" for support rendered during the educational process.
47. See cases cited supra note 33.
48. Horstman, 263 N.W.2d at 885; Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 266.
49. See cases cited supra note 33.
50. Horstman, 263 N.W.2d at 885. The court, however, refused to hold that the
educational degree itself was property capable of division at divorce. Id. at 891.
51. Id. at 890.
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the enhanced earning capacity of the professional husband to be a
divisible marital asset was the only alternative to the nonacquiring
spouse leaving the marriage with little or nothing.
The following year, a Kentucky court concluded that a supporting
spouse was entitled to an interest in the dentistry degree and license
of her husband equal to her monetary investment in his education.52
More recently, a Michigan court of appeals held that a law degree
should be considered marital property, if earned as a result of the
mutual effort of both spouses.53 The court remanded the case for a
determination of the value of the legal education, based on the
length of the marriage, the financial support contributed by the
nonacquiring spouse, and the division of other marital property. 54
Clearly, the approach in other states, contrary to the approach uti-
lized in California, has not been a wholesale rejection of any and all
forms of compensation for support rendered during the educational
process.5 5 Many courts are favorably disposed toward employing eq-
uitable measures designed to afford the nonprofessional spouse some
type of recovery for his or her contributions. Largely, this trend ap-
pears to be a function of the wide latitude afforded the majority of
divorce courts in other states to achieve an equitable property divi-
sion (latitude not available in California, which mandates an equal
division of marital assets at divorce) and to determine spousal sup-
port payments. 6 In most instances, the result has been a form of
roughly calculated reimbursement to the spouse who leaves the mar-
riage without an enhanced earning capacity. In a few states, the
courts have rejected an equitable resolution in favor of awarding the
supporting partner an interest or right of reimbursement in the en-
hanced earning capacity or education itself.57 These cases, while in-
52. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 266. Again, the equities of the situation demanded a
novel definition of what constituted marital property. At the time of the dissolution, the
Inmans, due to the husband's unwise financial investments, were on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 270.
53. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 260, 337 N.W.2d at 334.
54. Id. at 263, 337 N.W.2d at 337. To aid the trial court in determining the
present value of the degree, the appellate court ordered it to estimate what the holder of
a legal degree could expect to earn, and subtract from that figure the salary he or she
could reasonably expect to earn without the degree. Id. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337.
55. Compare Greer, 32 Colo. App. at 189, 510 P.2d at 907; Bowen, 347 So. 2d at
676-78; Horstman, 263 N.W.2d at 885; Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 266; Woodworth, 126
Mich. App. at 258, 337 N.W.2d at 332; De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 757-59; Vanet, 544
S.W.2d at 241; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 617, 228 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1975);
with Sullivan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 638, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
56. Note, supra note 26, at 143, n.11.
57. See cases cited supra note 33.
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frequent, demonstrate that the judicial community is not entirely ad-
verse to the creation of novel property rights where a perceived
injustice is presented.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE
AMENDMENTS
Somewhat surprisingly, the equitable measures utilized in other
states to compensate a spouse for support rendered during the educa-
tion of his or her marital partner do not appear to have been a sig-
nificant factor in the decision of the California State Legislature to
promulgate Assembly Bill 3000.58 The impetus for this seminal bill,
which mandates reimbursement for community contributions to a
spouse's education or training, 59 must be largely credited to one case,
In re Marriage of Sullivan.0
The Sullivan case garnered substantial publicity during both its
initial and subsequent appeals."' The second decision, denying to
Mrs. Sullivan any type of compensation for her personal financial
contributions to the degree of her husband, was regarded in some
political circles as a complete judicial failure to remedy a substantial
injustice.6 2 As a result, Assemblyman Alister McAllister, a member
of the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, and the California
Law Revision Commission 3 began independently examining the
58. See generally COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUES PRESENTED IN SULLIVAN V.
SULLIVAN, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY (1984)
(hearings of Nov. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS]. AB
3000 is codified at CAL, CIV. CODE §§ 4800.3 and 4801 (West Supp. 1985).
59. A.B. 3000, Cal. Leg. 1983 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.3 and 4801).
No statute in any other state explicitly requires reimbursement for educational costs. An
Indiana statute, however, does provide for the repayment at dissolution of monies ex-
pended by one spouse toward the tuition, books, and laboratory fees of the other spouse's
higher education in the event the court finds little or no marital property to divide. IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (West 1980).
60. 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at 771, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 359. The Sullivan case underscored the unfairness of situations where a
marriage dissolves shortly after the graduation of the professional spouse, at a stage
where few community assets have been acquired to compensate the community for its
financial sacrifices in support of the educational process. Under then applicable Califor-
nia law, Mrs. Sullivan was awarded exactly half of the negligible community assets; no
alimony was awarded as she was self-supporting. Id. at 638, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800. See
generally JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58.
61. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 638, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at
771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
62. See generally JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58.
63. The California Law Revision Commission was created by chapter 45 of the
statutes of 1953. The commission consists of one Senate and one Assembly member,
seven members appointed by the governor, and a non-voting legislative counsel member.
CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 7
(Vol. 1957). The principle duties of the commission are: 1) to examine California stat-
utes and case law for defects and anachronisms and propose reforms; 2) to receive and
consider proposed changes in the laws made by other official sources; 3) to receive and
consider recommendations from the legal profession and the public regarding changes in
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Sullivan issue, with a view toward proposing remedial legislation.64
Assemblyman McAllister first addressed the issue by introducing
Assembly Bill 525, which would have awarded the community a per-
centage of the professional spouse's present and future earnings
equal to the portion of earning capacity realized during the mar-
riage.6 5 The bill, however, failed to clear the Judiciary Committee by
a majority vote.66
During the course of the Judiciary Committee's hearings on As-
sembly Bill 525, Nathaniel Sterling, representing the California Law
Revision Committee, presented testimony. The proposal of his com-
mittee avoided many difficulties believed to be inherent in Assembly
Bill 525 by delineating a reimbursement scheme, coupled with the
recognition of community educational contributions in spousal sup-
port awards. 67 A solution of this type was also endorsed by a sub-
stantial number of individuals who testified before the Judiciary
Committee during the course of its hearings.6 8
Assembly Bill 3000
Following the defeat of Assembly Bill 525, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Assemblyman Elihu Harris, proposed a second
bill, Assembly Bill 3000, which in substance adopted the proposals of
the California Law Revision Committee.6 9 This bill cleared the judi-
the law; and 4) to recommend such changes as are necessary to modernize California
law. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10330 (West 1980).
64. Id. Assemblyman McAllister introduced an unsuccessful predecessor of AB
3000, AB 525, on the same day that the California Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in the Sullivan case. Id. at 76.
65. Assembly Bill 525, Cal. Leg. 1983.
66. Note, supra note 29, at 295.
67. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF EDUCATION EXPENSES (1983) [hereinafter cited as LAW REVISION
RECOMMENDATION]. The commission noted:
[We do] not believe it would be either practical or fair to classify the value of
the education, degree, or license, or the enhanced earning capacity, as commu-
nity property and to divide the value upon marriage dissolution. Classification
of these items as community property would create problems involving man-
agement control, creditor's rights, taxation, and disposition at death, not to
mention the complexities involved in valuation at dissolution.
Id. at 6.
68. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58, at 41, 43, 53, 59-60. Those
who commented favorably upon a reimbursement remedy included a representative of
the State Bar of California Family Law Section; a representative of the State Bar of
California Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section; the chairman of the San
Diego County Bar Association Family Law Specialists Advisory Committee; and an ad-junct professor of family law. Id.
69. A.B. 3000, Cal. Leg. 1983 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.3, 4801);
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ciary committees of both the Assembly and Senate, as well as the
full Assembly and Senate, and was sent to the governor largely in-
tact. 7 0 The governor signed the bill into law on September 30, 1984.
By its provisions, it became effective on January 1, 1985.71 With the
exception of a few groups who believed that the legislation did not
constitute adequate recognition of the supporting spouse's contribu-
tions,72 the new Civil Code provisions received widespread endorse-
ment as a plausible method of giving a nonprofessional spouse some
compensation for his or her financial support during the educational
process.73
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE AMENDMENTS
Assembly Bill 3000, codified at California Civil Code sections
4800.3 and 4801, which mandates reimbursement to the community
for contributions toward a degree or license acquired during mar-
riage, is the first legislative enactment of its kind in the United
States.7 4 As promulgated by the California legislature, its twin
objectives are to provide reimbursement to the community (and thus
the supporting spouse) for educational costs, 75 and to offer in some
LAW REVISION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 67.
70. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, CALI-
FORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY (1984) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST].
AB 3000 cleared the Assembly Judiciary Committee by a vote of eight to zero, the As-
sembly floor by a vote of sixty to nine, the Senate Judiciary Committee by a vote of
seven to two (where a ten year limitation period for reimbursement expenses was elimi-
nated in favor of a rebuttable presumption against community reimbursement if the ex-
penditures were made more than ten years before dissolution, and where a requirement
was added that parties who seek to deviate from the statutory reimbursement right must
reduce their agreement to writing), and the Senate floor by a vote of twenty-five to nine.
Id. at 1, 5. The final Assembly vote which sent the bill to the governor, as revised, was
fifty-six to eight. The Daily Recorder, Sept. 4, 1984, at 1, col 1-3.
71. A.B. 3000, Cal. Leg. 1983 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.3, 4801).
72. The Daily Recorder, Sept. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 3. Among those who went on
record as critical of the new bill was Assemblyman McAllister, the sponsor of AB 525,
the unsuccessful predecessor of AB 3000. Id.
73. As previously noted, the reimbursement scheme was looked upon favorably by
several individuals testifying to the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. See supra
note 68.
74. An Indiana statute does address the issue of compensation, at dissolution, for
financial contributions to a professional degree. The code section provides that:
When the court finds there is little or no marital property, it may award either
spouse a money judgment not limited to the existing property. However, this
award may be made only for the financial contribution of one (1) spouse to-
ward tuition, books and laboratory fees for the higher education of the other
spouse.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (West 1980). In addition, a Wisconsin statute pro-
vides that at divorce, marital property may be divided unequally between the spouses
where one party has contributed to the education, training, or increased earning power of
the other. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1977).
75. A.B. 3000, Cal. Leg. 1983 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.3). The reim-
1286
[VOL. 22: 1275. 1985] Community Reimbursement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
instances further compensation in the form of enhanced alimony
payments. 76 In the wake of their enactment, however, the new code
sections leave unresolved several problematic issues.
Community Contributions
One issue not clearly addressed by the addition of section 4800.3
to the California Civil Code is the question of what will specifically
constitute a community contribution to the education or training of a
spouse. Section 4800.3 defines such contributions only generally as
"payments made with community property for education or training
or for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or training. ' 1
Construed in a narrow, literal sense, this phraseology suggests that
reimbursement be confined to costs directly attributable to the costs
of schooling, such as tuition, books, and other related fees. This con-
struction finds support in an Indiana family code section. The Indi-
ana statute permits the divorce court, when it finds there is little or
no marital property, to award either spouse a monetary judgment,
not limited to existing property, for the contributions of one spouse
toward the tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the higher educa-
tion of his or her marital partner.7 8
A more liberal construction would interpret the statutory language
of section 4800.3 as encompassing indirect contributions to the edu-
cational process such as meals, lodging, transportation, and the like.
Certainly an argument can be made that these types of payments are
a part of the cost of an education; without them, in most instances,
the professional spouse would not have been able to pursue his or her
higher education.7 9 Furthermore, there is a limited body of precedent
which supports such an interpretation. A Minnesota court, in In re
Marriage of De La Rosa,80 has calculated that restitution afforded
bursement scheme includes interest, at the legal rate (currently ten percent), calculated
at the end of each year in which expenses are incurred. In addition, the remedy is subject
to an express written agreement of the parties differing from the statutory formula, and
to reduction or modification to the extent that full reimbursement is unjust. LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL'S DIGEST, supra note 70.
76. A.B. 3000, Cal. Leg. 1983 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(a) (West Supp. 1985).
78. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (West 1980). The proposal submitted by
the California Law Revision Committee also indicated that reimbursement should be
limited to "money actually contributed for payment of tuition, fees, books, supplies, etc."
LAW REVISION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 67, at 7.
79. This might be the case, for example, where the student has no independent
means of support, and has relied on his or her spouse's income to finance the couple's
living expenses.
80. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). Contra IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c)
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the supporting spouse for assistance during the educational process
should include compensation for both living and educational
expenses.81
Under an extremely broad interpretation, the language in section
4800.3 is capable of engulfing almost any payment made by the
community, however tangentially related to the actual attainment of
a degree or license, if made while one spouse is pursuing an educa-
tion. For example, the supporting spouse might successfully argue
that money paid by the community to finance a Hawaiian vacation
generated reimbursable educational costs, insofar as the trip pro-
vided a necessary break from studies for the student spouse who
without the break would have been unable to complete his or her
education. While arguments as clearly specious as this should not
pose an insurmountable obstacle to a trial court awarding reimburse-
ment to the community, determining where to draw the line in other
situations will be substantially more arduous.82
Because the general guidelines promulgated by section 4800.3 pro-
vide no concrete answers for trial judges asked to engage in a subjec-
tive analysis of which community payments are reimbursable, 3 the
courts must, at the first opportunity, deliniate more precisely which
contributions are compensable. In the interest of fairness to all mar-
ried individuals, this new code section should not be interpreted too
broadly. Payments which have had a demonstrably direct and benefi-
cial effect on the acquisition of the education or training of the pro-
fessional should be reimbursed. Those expenses with only a tangen-
tial relationship to the education, common to marriages where
neither spouse acquires an advanced degree, should be excluded. In
the former category, expenses such as tuition, books, fees, the cost of
moving to the community where the education is pursued, and other
payments which would not have been incurred but for the educa-
tional process, should clearly be reimbursed at dissolution. 4 In the
(West 1980) (restitutionary award limited to tuition, books, and laboratory fees).
81. De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 757.
82. For example, an argument that rental or home mortgage payments made by
the community were necessary to the attainment of one spouse's education might present
a less clear situation, especially in instances where the student, if unmarried, could not
have met such expenses.
83. Such a determination would of necessity be at least partially governed by the
circumstances of each case. For instance, where a professional husband chose to divorce
his supporting wife quickly after his graduation, and she had worked for years at an
undesirable job to put him through school, the court might favor an expansive definition
of reimbursable costs. Not surprisingly, in all of the cases thus far reported, it has been
the wife, traditionally the one to leave the marriage in a poor financial condition, who has
provided support while her husband went to school. See generally Mullenix, supra note
32, at 229. Of course, section 4800.3 makes no gender distinctions and would automati-
cally apply to either marital partner. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
84. The California Law Revision Committee, which drafted the original proposal
that culminated in section 4800.3, has suggested that reimbursable costs be limited to
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latter category, indirect support furnished by the nonprofessional
spouse, such as rent, food and clothing--expenses common to all
marriages, whether or not either spouse becomes a profes-
sional-should not be considered compensable under section
4800.3.85
Any interpretation of this code section permitting the community
to be reimbursed for indirect payments would give the minority of
marriages, where one spouse gains an education, a unique and unjus-
tifiable status in comparison to the vast majority of marriages where
section 4800.3 is inapplicable. In most marital partnerships, either
the community or one spouse alone finances basic necessities with no
possibility of reimbursement at divorce.86 To single out one type of
marriage, and in effect, one marital (the supporting) partner as the
recipient of special treatment at divorce is both unmerited and un-
fair."' Any attempt to do so defeats the very goal of equality among
divorcing couples that the California legislature, by the enactment of
this code section, sought to accomplish. 88
Prior to the enactment of the new code sections, the California
courts refused to recognize even a limited property interest in an ed-
ucation. Confronted with the legislative intent of these provisions,
the courts must now recognize that certain educational expenses are,
at a minimum, reimbursable. The courts, are now in a position to
determine the extent to which the reimbursement remedy may be
utilized. Given their attitude prior to the revision of the California
Civil Code, it is to be expected that where they can limit the impli-
cations of the revisions, the courts will exploit the opportunity to do
so. Considering the potential abuses to which these new code sections
are subject, a conservative court attitude toward their implementa-
tion would appear to be the best approach.
tuition, books, and fees. LAW REVISION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 67, at 7. This
limitation, however, could lead to great unfairness in cases where the community has
incurred unusual but substantial expenses (such as the cost of moving to the student
spouse's school) that would not have arisen but for the acquisition of the education.
85. Under California law, such family expenses are presumed to have been paid
with community funds and are not reimbursable. Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144,
27 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1962). Even if a party proves that separate funds were used to pay
such expenses, at divorce no reimbursement is permitted. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 51
Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). Should section 4800.3 be interpreted to mandate repayment for
such family expenses, the result would be directly counter to these judicial concepts, and
single out one type of marriage for unique treatment.
86. See, 64 Cal. 2d at 778, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
87. Id.
88. See LAW REVISION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 67, at 5.
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Substantial Enhancement of Earning Capacity
Section 4800.3 also fails to define the type of education or training
that more than marginally increases the earning capacity of the re-
cipient spouse and thus qualifies as a source of reimbursable ex-
penses at divorce.89 The relevant subsection merely states that "the
community shall be reimbursed for community contributions-to edu-
cation or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning
capacity of the party."90 Clearly, a painting class taken during mar-
riage will not meet this standard; just as clearly, expenses incurred
during a three year legal education will qualify for reimbursement.9 '
Between these two extremes, however, there are a myriad of situa-
tions where the question of whether education or training has "sub-
stantially enhanced" the earning capacity of an individual cannot
easily be answered.92 Unfortunately, the question of what enhance-
ment is substantial is inherently subjective.13 Because the wording of
this portion of the statute is unavoidably vague, the final determina-
tion of whether a particular training or educational program meets
the section 4800.3 substantiality test lies within the discretion of the
trial judge. If judges comply with the spirit of the new law,94 the
community will be reimbursed for payments aiding the completion of
a degree which has clearly increased the student's potential salary.
Thus, the uncertainty of these provisions, while not entirely curable,
is not a complete bar to the restitutionary goal of the statute.95
Spousal Support
While the reimbursement provisions of section 4800.3 may be
overgenerous in scope, section 4801, as amended by the California
legislature, 96 suffers from the opposite shortcoming. This section pro-
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
90. Id.
91. In the three California cases to directly address the status of an education,
the husband had acquired an advanced professional degree which unarguably and sub-
stantially enhanced his earning capacity. Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 656, (medical
degree), modified, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796, rev'd, 837 Cal. 3d at
771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359; Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 668
(law degree) disapproved on other grounds in Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 841, 166 Cal. Rptr.
at 853; Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (law degree).
92. For example, a rather common situation is one in which the professional ac-
quired a portion of his or her education before marriage.
93. The California Law Revision Committee has noted that where earning capac-
ity is enhanced only "marginally," reimbursement should not be granted. LAw REVISION
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 67, at 7.
94. According to the legislative counsel affiliated with AB 3000, the new code
provisions attempt to "place the parties on an equal footing without generating a windfall
for the working spouse or permanently impairing the student spouse's future." LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, supra note 70, at 3.
95. Id.
96. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1985).
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vides that in determining whether to order spousal support, the court
shall consider, among other factors, "the extent to which the sup-
ported spouse contributed to the attainment of an education, train-
ing, or a license by the other spouse." 97 The legislative history of the
statute indicates that its introduction was motivated primarily by the
desire to provide additional compensation, beyond that required by
section 4800.3, for community support rendered to the educated
spouse.98 The provision as enacted, however, does nothing to alter the
bald fact that only approximately fifteen percent of all dissolutions
result in any type of alimony award. 9 Of that fifteen percent, a
much smaller number of payees actually receive the full amount of
their award. 100 Furthermore, alimony payments, on the whole, are
not substantial and continue only for a limited time period.101 These
statistics tend to emasculate the goal of compensation which section
4801 attempts to achieve.10 2
Revised section 4801, in addition to being a largely ineffectual
means of compensating the supporting spouse,10 3 also suffers from
some measure of inconsistency with the section 4800.3 reimburse-
ment scheme. 0 If the latter code provision is limited to the reim-
bursement of direct educational costs, as this Comment has sug-
gested, section 4801, inasmuch as it may provide compensation for
indirect community contributions, creates a potential means of cir-
cumventing reimbursement limitations.10 5 However, the potential for
abuse of the spousal support provision is limited in two ways: first,
by the fact that so few divorces actually result in alimony awards of
any size, 0 6 and second, by the fact that alimony awards are usually
predicated upon the inability of one spouse to support himself or her-
97. Id. at § 4801(a)(1).
98. According to the legislative counsel, the support provision is not intended to
duplicate § 4800.3 reimbursement. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, supra note 70, at 6.
99. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58, at 62, 67.
100. Id.
101. Id. Very broadly, spousal maintenance payments are $200 or less per month,
and are awarded for only a "rehabilitative" period of four or five years. Id. at 67.
102. See supra note 95.
103. As previously noted, approximately eighty-five percent of all divorces result in
no alimony award. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58. Requiring contri-
butions to be one factor of many considered in awarding alimony does not appear to be
an adequate means of reversing this trend.
104. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
105. Permitting spousal support awards based entirely on indirect community con-
tributions will also, of necessity, give the supporting spouse a distinct advantage at disso-
lution over other divorcing individuals who have incurred the same expenses (e.g., food,
clothing, rental payments), but who are ineligible for section 4801 compensation.
106. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 58, at 62, 67.
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self after divorce, due to the circumstances surrounding the mar-
riage.1 0 7 The second limitation makes it particularly unlikely that in
a dissolution where one spouse has acquired an education support to
the nonprofessional spouse will be awarded. In most instances, the
spouse who has financed the education will have the ability to sup-
port himself or herself after the dissolution decree becomes final.108
Due to the foregoing considerations, section 4801, as amended,
will only have a minimal impact on dissolutions involving reimburse-
ment for an education or training. Its usefulness appears limited to
the relatively rare instances in which the supporting spouse is inca-
pable of self-support after dissolution. In these situations, section
4801 may provide some measure of relief.'0 9 This code section, how-
ever, should not be extended to provide compensation for support
claims based solely on indirect contributions made by the community
toward one spouse's education. Such a result is inconsistent with
both the section 4800.3 reimbursement remedy and the goals under-
lying the section 4801 spousal support provisions.
COMMUNITY REIMBURSEMENT FOR EDUCATIONAL COSTS WITHIN
THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
The ramifications of the enactment of section 4800.3 upon the
California community property system should not go unmentioned.
California law in this area is grounded upon the principle that all
property acquired during marriage, other than that received by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent, is community property" and must be
equally divided upon divorce."' Section 4800.3 is an exception to
this general principle in that it limits the community interest to re-
imbursement for the educational costs incurred by one spouse, al-
though his or her training was acquired entirely during the mar-
riage.11 2 To conceptually reconcile the treatment of educational costs
with the rest of the California community property system, one must
in essence concede that the legislature has determined, contrary to
case law, 13 that an education has the status of separate property."14
107. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, supra note 70.
108. In the cases to date, the individuals attempting to claim some type of compen-
sation for contributions to a spouse's education have supported both themselves and their
marital partner during the acquisition of the degree. E.g., Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 766,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 356. In many instances, the nonprofessional has sufficient job skills to
support himself or herself after divorce. This was the case in Sullivan. See supra note 23.
109. The justification for an alimony award in this type of situation rests not on
indirect contributions by one spouse to the education of the other, but on the need for
financial assistance to meet the daily living expenses of one marital partner after the
marriage has ended.
110. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108, 5110 (West 1983).
111. Id. at § 4800.
112. Id. at § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
113. See Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 637, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 799, rev'd, 37 Cal.
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Separate property, although not divisible upon dissolution, 1 5 is sub-
ject to a reimbursement claim by the community if community funds
have been spent to enhance the separate estate."16 Difficulties sur-
rounding this legislative determination arise because an education
does not have the qualities normally attributed to separate property;
most significantly, it may be acquired entirely within the scope of the
marriage, with funds exclusively provided by the community.117 In-
deed, some commentators have analogized a professional degree to
intangible community property such as nonvested pension rights.,, 8
Intuitively, a professional degree may appear to share the character-
istics of community property; however, the adherence by the legisla-
ture to a reimbursement formula seems to necessitate its classifica-
tion as the separate property of the recipient.
This apparent inconsistency in the characterization of an educa-
tion as a property right can be easily harmonized with the message
implicit in section 4800.3 by a judicial, or, if necessary, a legislative
determination that a professional degree or license is separate prop-
erty. As the legislature has by inference already decided the issue,"19
the debate should be removed once and for all from the court sys-
tem, ensuring that the new code sections regarding an education or
training are effectively reconciled with the body of California com-
munity property law.
CONCLUSION
The new California Code provisions regarding the acquisition of a
professional degree reflect the desire of the legislature to provide
3d at 771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
114. On its initial hearing, this was the conclusion the Sullivan appellate court
reached. Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 656, modified, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 637, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 799, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d at 771, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1983).
116. Section 4800.2, for instance, provides that "[i]n the division of community
property ... unless a written waiver is made ... the party shall be reimbursed for his
or her contributions to the acquisition of the [separate] property [of the other spouse] to
the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source." Id. at §
4800.2 (West Supp. 1985).
117. Under sections 5107 and 5108, separate property is that acquired before mar-
riage, after the marriage ends, or at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent. CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1983). There is a rebuttable presumption that all prop-
erty acquired during marriage belongs to the community. See Freese v. Hibernia Savings
and Loan, 139 Cal. 392, 73 P. 172 (1903).
118. See generally Note, supra note 29; Note, supra note 26.
119. Although the legislature may not have realized the full legal implications of
its action, this conclusion is virtually inescapable.
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some measure of compensation to a spouse who has contributed to
the education or training of his or her partner. The provisions do
address an issue in need of timely resolution. However, in light of the
extremely limited experience nationwide with such an approach, 120
the California judiciary and the legislature, if necessary, should act
to clarify issues left unresolved in Civil Code sections 4800.3 and
4801.
Specifically, the reimbursement remedy mandated by section
4800.3 should be confined to those expenses which have a direct,
beneficial impact on the acquisition of an education or training. This
section should not be read to encompass family expenses which are
common to the vast majority of marriages; interpreting this provision
in its broadest sense unfairly singles out one class of marriages for
uniquely favorable treatment. In a similar manner, compensable
educational or training costs should be limited to those which have a
demonstrable impact on the earning capacity of an individual. The
spousal support provisions should be confined to the dissolution of
marriages where the nonprofessional spouse is incapable of self-sup-
port. Predicating such awards on indirect contributions to an educa-
tion defeats the purpose behind both alimony awards and reimburse-
ment for educational costs. Finally, the judicial community should
explicitly endorse the implicit finding of the California legislature
that a degree or license is the separate property of its holder, and
thereby reconcile the new provisions with the remainder of the Cali-
fornia community property system.
SUSAN C. PESHEL
120. See supra note 59.
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